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Where the AKP Stands: A Manifesto-
Based Approach to Party Competition 
in Turkey 
 
SALIH BAYRAM* 
 
 
Abstract Using the Manifesto Project’s dataset, this article considers two questions: Where 
does the AKP stand vis-à-vis other parties in Turkey? What were the dynamics of party 
competition in recent Turkish elections? With regards to the first question, the article finds 
that the AKP’s manifestos are closer to those of center-right parties in Turkey, rather than to 
those of Islamist parties. It also finds that in the AKP’s overall discourse, the most important 
and persistent element is a focus on technocratic issues, referring to promises such as more 
investment in education, cultural activities, and technology and infrastructure, which are 
relatively uncontroversial in Turkey. With regards to the second question, the main finding of 
the paper is that dramatic re-arrangements happened in the relative positions of the parties, 
mostly involving the CHP (the main opposition party) which experienced major shifts in its 
attitude towards nationalism and new left issues in each of the last two elections. The AKP 
and the MHP increasingly became more nationalist in successive elections in the 2000s, and 
all parties put increasingly more emphasis on technocratic issues, reflecting a fierce 
competition in that field. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been compared to many other parties and 
movements both from Turkey and from abroad, including the Christian democratic parties of 
Europe,
1
 Islamist and secular movements and parties from the Arab world,
2
 social democratic 
                                                          
* Salih Bayram is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Yalova University. 
1
 William Hale compares and contrasts AKP with MRP of France, CDU/CSU of Germany and Christian 
Democrats of Italy. See Hale, “Christian Democracy and the AKP: Parallels and Contrasts”, Turkish Studies 6, 
no. 2 (2005): 293-310. 
2
 A. Kadir Yıldırım compares “Muslim democratic parties in Turkey, Egypt and Morocco”, Gamze Çavdar  
compares AKP to other “political Islamist” parties in the Middle east, and Mounir Shafiq draws parallels 
between Turkey’s AKP on the one hand and Egypt’s Nasserism and the Palestinian Fatah on the other to make 
the case that leaders’ origins in Islamist movements and their lifestyles cannot be sufficient grounds to describe 
the party as Islamist. See Yıldırım, “Muslim Democratic Parties in Turkey, Egypt, and Morocco: An Economic 
Explanation”, Insight Turkey 11, no. 4 (2009): 65; Çavdar, “Islamist New Thinking in Turkey: A Model for 
Political Learning?” Political Science Quarterly 121, no. 3 (2006): 478; and Shafiq, “Turkey’s Justice and 
Development Party through Arab Eyes”, Insight Turkey 11, no. 1 (2009). 
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parties in Latin America,
3
 third way parties of Europe,
4
 Republicans of the US,
5
 and center-
right and Islamist parties of Turkey.
6
  
In these efforts, scholars looked at different aspects of the party such as the 
political/ideological background of the leadership,
7
 characteristics of the voter base,
8
 
structure of the party organization,
9
 content (party program, election manifestos, speeches) 
                                                          
3
 Marcie J. Patton compares problems faced by AKP government to those faced by left-wing political parties in 
Latin America, and more specifically draws parallels between AKP and Brazil’s Worker’s Party, arguing that 
“Both Brazil’s Workers’ Party (PT, Partido dos Trabalhadores) under Lula’s leadership and the AKP under 
Erdogan's have been proponents of neoliberalism with a human face.” See Patton, “The Economic Policies of 
Turkey's AKP Government: Rabbits from a Hat?” Middle East Journal 60, no. 3 (2006): 514. 
4
 Ziya Öniş argues that there are “certain parallels between the AKP and the third way style, European social 
democratic parties”. Öniş, “Turkish Modernization and Challenges for the New Europe”, Perceptions 9, no. 
Autumn (2004): 14. 
5
 According to Şaban Kardaş, “Analysis of the JDP might be served better by comparing it to the US Republican 
Party rather than to the European Christian Democrats” because “Instead of a European-style party 
characterized by a strong identity/ideology, representing narrowly defined class or single-issue interests, based 
on actively involved grassroots and provincial officers, and headed by a vertical party organization, the JDP 
may evolve toward an American-style loose party organization, based on the representation of a coalition of  
interests, mobilized at times of election”. Kardaş, “Turkey under the Justice and Development Party: Between 
Transformation of ‘Islamism’ and Democratic Consolidation?” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 17, no. 
2 (2008): 180. 
6
 For studies comparing the AKP to the National Outlook parties, see: Hasret Dikici Bilgin, “Foreign Policy 
Orientation of Turkey’s Pro-Islamist Parties: A Comparative Study of the AKP and Refah”, Turkish Studies 9, 
no. 3 (2008); Şebnem Gümüşçü and Deniz Sert, “The March 2009 Local Elections and the Inconsistent 
Democratic Transformation of the AKP Party in Turkey”, Middle East Critique 19, no. 1 (2010); Ayşe Güneş 
Ayata and Fatma Tütüncü. “Party Politics of the AKP (2002–2007) and the Predicaments of Women at the 
Intersection of the Westernist, Islamist and Feminist Discourses in Turkey”, British Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies 35, no. 3 (2008); B. Ali Soner, “The Justice and Development Party’s policies towards non-Muslim 
minorities in Turkey”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 12, no. 1 (2010); and Menderes Çınar, 
“Turkey's Transformation under the AKP's Rule”, The Muslim World 96 (2006). For studies drawing parallels 
between the AKP and the center-right parties DP and ANAP, see: Bülent Aras and Aylin Görener, “National 
Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Orientation: the Ideational Bases of the Justice and Development Party’s 
Foreign Policy Activism in the Middle East”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 12, no. 1 (2010); and 
Ali Ekber Doğan, “AKP'li Hegemonya Projesi ve Neoliberalismin Yeniden Dirilişi [AKP’s Hegemony Project 
and the Rebirth of Neo-Liberalism]”, Praksis 23 (2010). 
7
 Erhan Doğan, among others, calls attention to “the Islamist background of the leadership cadre” of the AKP, 
Basheer M. Nafi refers to AKP leaders’ “strong roots in the Islamic Refah Party”, and Mounir Shafiq  argues 
that the AKP cannot be described “as an Islamist party only because of its origins”, drawing attention to the 
similar case of the Palestinian movement Fatah, which for a long time was “accused of being a branch of the 
‘Muslim Brotherhood’”. See Doğan, “The Historical and Discoursive Roots of the Justice and Development 
Party’s EU Stance”, Turkish Studies 6, no. 3 (2005): 433; Nafi, “The Arabs and Modern Turkey: A Century of 
Changing Perceptions”, Insight Turkey 11, no. 1 (2009): 73; Shafiq, “Turkey’s Justice and Development Party”, 
34.   
8
 İbrahim Dalmış and Ertan Aydın use survey data from various sources to examine the parties that AKP voters 
and members supported before the AKP was established, and how the voters defined their political positions. 
Using survey data, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu examines the determinants of vote for AKP, and compares AKP voters 
with the voters of other parties on the right. Hakan Yavuz cites survey data on whether AKP voters define 
themselves as Islamist, rightist, democrat, conservative, social  democrat, nationalist, Kemalist,  or nationalist-
conservative. See Dalmış and Aydın, “The Social Bases of the Justice and Development Party”, in Secular and 
Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party, edited by Ümit Cizre (New York: 
Routledge, 2008); Kalaycıoğlu, “Justice and Development Party at the Helm: Resurgence of Islam or Restitution 
of the Right-of-Center Predominant Party?” Turkish Studies 11, no. 1 (2010); and Yavuz, Secularism and 
Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 108. 
9
 Ayşe Güneş Ayata and Fatma Tütüncü examine women’s auxiliaries in AKP’s organization, and Pelin Ayan 
compares party structures of AKP and CHP in terms of the power relations between  party headquarters and the 
local branches. See Ayata and Tütüncü, “Party Politics of the AKP”; and Ayan, “Authoritarian Party Structures 
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produced by the party,
10
 policies followed once in power,
11
 the lifestyles of leaders and their 
families,
12
 or a combination of these. The names and adjectives used to describe the party 
have varied greatly and can be placed in three broad categories:  
 
1. Some authors choose adjectives that focus attention on the relationship of the party to 
Islamist politics in Turkey, each describing this relationship in a different way: an 
“Islamist” party,13 a “pro-Islamic”14 or “pro-Islamist”15 party, “a party with a 
moderate Islamist orientation”,16 an “Islam-sensitive” party,17 an “Islam-friendly 
party”,18 a party providing “political leadership” to “the Islamic movement” in 
Turkey,
19
 the representative of “Islamist new thinking” in Turkey as in Gorbachev’s 
new thinking,
20
 and a “light fundamentalist”21 party with a “moderate Islam 
ideology”.22 Implicit in these descriptions is the idea that AKP is the latest incarnation 
of a long line of Islamist parties in Turkey, also known as National Outlook parties, 
which started in 1970 with the National Order Party (MNP) of Necmettin Erbakan. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in Turkey: A Comparison of the Republican People’s Party and the Justice and Development Party”, Turkish 
Studies 11, no. 2 (2010). 
10
 For example Gümüşçü and Sert refer to Erdoğan’s speeches and the party program, Ayata and Tütüncü 
examine the AKP monthly Türkiye Bülteni and press interviews by the party leaders, as well as interviews with 
and questionnaires filled out by the cadre of the party, and Bilgin examines party programs of the AKP and RP. 
See Gümüşçü and Sert, “March 2009 Local Elections”; Ayata and Tütüncü, “Party Politics of the AKP”; and 
Bilgin, “Foreign Policy Orientation”. 
11
 For studies of the AKP’s policies towards religious and ethnic minorities, for example, see Talha Köse, “The 
AKP and the ‘Alevi Opening’: Understanding the Dynamis of the Rapprochment”, Insight Turkey 12, no. 2 
(2010); M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, “The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and Development 
Party”, Middle East Policy 13, no. 1 (2006); Soner, “Policies Towards non-Muslim Minorities”; and Kerem 
Karaosmanoğlu, “Reimagining Minorities in Turkey: Before and After the AKP”, Insight Turkey 12, no. 2 
(2010). For studies of AKP’s foreign policy, see Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Between Europeanization and 
Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era”, Turkish Studies 10, no. 1 (2009); 
Ramazan Kılınç, “Turkey and the Alliance of Civilizations: Norm Adoption as a Survival Strategy”, Insight 
Turkey 11, no. 3 (2009); Doğan, “Historical and Discursive Roots”; Aras and Görener, “National Role 
Conceptions”; Bilgin, Foreign Policy Orientation”; and Ali Rahigh-Aghsan, “Turkey's EU Quest and Political 
Cleavages under AKP”, Review of European Studies 3, no. 1 (2011). 
12
 Hasan Turunç notes that “most of the leaders of the party are conservative with respect to their lifestyle”, and 
Mounir Shafiq observes that “a large number of the party’s members and leaders cling to aspects of personal 
religiosity, including the wearing of the hijab by their wives or by female members”, although this is not 
sufficient grounds to label the party as Islamist. Turunç, “Islamicist or Democratic? The AKP's Search for 
Identity in Turkish Politics”, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 15, no. 1 (2007): 87; Shafiq, 
“Turkey’s Justice and Development Party”, 35. 
13
 Ali Ekber Doğan, “29 Mart 2009 Seçimleri ve AKP: Türkiye’nin Siyasal Coğrafyası Açısından Bir 
Değerlendirme [March 29, 2009 Elections and the AKP: An Evaluation from the Perspective of Turkey’s 
Political Geography]”, Praksis 21 (2009). 
14
 Yavuz and Özcan, “The Kurdish Question”. 
15
 Bilgin, “Foreign Policy Orientation”. 
16
 Öniş, “Turkish Modernization”. 
17
 Patton, “Economic Policies”, 515. 
18
 Ümit Cizre, “Introduction: The Justice and Development Party: Making Choices, Revisions and Reversals 
Interactively”, in Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party, 
edited by Ümit Cizre (New York: Routledge, 2008): 2. 
19
 M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, “Crisis in Turkey: The Conflict of Political Languages”, Middle East 
Policy 14, no. 3 (2007). 
20
 Çavdar, “Islamist New Thinking”, 480. 
21
 Selen Korad Birkiye, “Changes in the Cultural Policies of Turkey and the Akp’s Impact on Social 
Engineering and Theatre”, International Journal of Cultural Policy 15, no. 3 (2009): 267. 
22
 Ibid., 261. 
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Frequently closed down by the military or by the Constitutional Court for activities 
against secularism, a succession of such parties were founded (the National Salvation 
Party-MSP, the Welfare Party-RP, the Virtue Party-FP, and the Felicity Party-SP) 
with practically the same cadres and same ideology. 
2. Other authors choose descriptions that call attention to the relationship of the party 
with the center-right/conservative tradition in Turkish politics: “a conservative-
democratic party”,23 a “Muslim democratic” party,24 “another conservative party with 
strong Islamist references”,25 “a moderate, center-right party”,26 “a- or non-Islamic, 
conservative democratic party”,27 a party that needs to be grounded “within the 
center-right political stream in Turkish politics”,28 a “central right party”,29 a “‘new-
rightist’ synthesis of liberalism and conservatism”,30 “a secular, conservative party, 
led by elements with an Islamic background”31 in the eyes of Arab observers, and “a 
Turkish secular party”.32 Implicit in these descriptions is the idea that the AKP is a 
member of another party family in Turkey, that of secular center-right parties, such as 
the Democratic Party (DP) of Adnan Menderes in 1950s, the Justice Party (AP) of 
Süleyman Demirel in 1960s and 70s, and the Motherland Party (ANAP) of Turgut 
Özal in 1980s. What made these parties different from Islamist parties was that, 
although they received the support of the more religious voters largely because the 
only other alternative was the left-wing parties disliked by religious groups, religion 
was a side issue in their overall platform. This platform tended to revolve around 
issues such as pro-market economic policies and pro-Western foreign policies. 
3. Still others prefer novel descriptions from various theoretical perspectives, usually 
depicting the party in contrast to some other political movement/current: a 
“conservative globalist” party as opposed to the “defensive nationalist” CHP and 
MHP,
33
 a defender of “passive secularism” as opposed to “assertive secularism”,34 a 
“political Islamist” party as opposed to “militant” Islamists,35 a product of “self-
                                                          
23
 Gümüşçü and Sert, “March 2009 Local Elections”, 55. 
24
 Yıldırım, “Muslim Democratic Parties”, 65. 
25
 Kalaycıoğlu, “Justice and Develpoment Party at the Helm”. 
26
 Filiz Başkan, “The Rising Islamic Business Elite and Democratization in Turkey”, Journal of Balkan and 
Near Eastern Studies 12, no. 4 (2010): 400. 
27
 Michael M. Gunter, review of Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, by Hakan Yavuz, Middle East 
Journal 63, no. 3 (2009): 511. 
28
 Kardaş, “Turkey under the Justice”, 178. 
29
 Betül Duman, “Conservative Modernization of Central Right: The Place of JDP and Erdogan Leadership”, 
European Journal of Social Sciences 24, no. 2 (2011): 191. 
30
 Doğan, “AKP’li Hegemonya Projesi”, 94. 
31
 Nafi, “Arabs and Modern Turkey”, 76. 
32
 Shafiq, “Turkey’s Justice and Development Party”, 36. 
33
 Ziya Öniş, “Conservative Globalism at the Crossrads: The Justice and Development Party and the Thorny 
Path to Democratic Consolidation in Turkey”, Mediterranean Politics 14, no. 1 (2009). 
34
 Ahmet Kuru, “Changing Perspectives on Islam and Secularism in Turkey: the AK Party and the Gülen 
Movement”, in Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement, edited by İhsan Yılmaz 
(London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007): 140; William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, Islamism, 
Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP (New York: Routledge, 2009): 23. 
35
 Çavdar, “Islamist New Thinking”, 478. 
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critical Islamism” of 1990s as opposed to “collective Islamism” of 1970s,36 and a 
“non-Islamist” party as opposed to the “post-Islamism of Virtue Party”.37 Such 
descriptions imply that the AKP is best understood not as the latest incarnation of an 
Islamist party or as a member of the center-right party family, but as a novel 
phenomenon with no historical precedent. 
 
The different descriptions alone are sufficient evidence that the AKP is “a strange, hybrid 
political formation”38 defying easy classification. This article will make yet another effort at 
classifying the AKP, comparing it with all the political parties in Turkey that have competed 
and won seats in the parliamentary elections since the 1950s, making use of election 
manifestos and the coding done by the Manifesto Project (previously Manifesto Research 
Group/Comparative Manifestos Project MRG/CMP). After explaining the data and the 
methods used, my focus will be on comparing and contrasting the AKP with center-right and 
Islamist parties, but I will also try to locate the party in a wider ideological space. Then, party 
competition in recent elections will be examined, with a focus on relative positions of the 
parties on major issue dimensions identified in previous sections, and how these positions 
have changed from election to election. The concluding section argues that the findings are 
also relevant to a debate in the voting behavior literature, between sociological and rational 
choice approaches, and suggests that future studies making combined use of textual analysis, 
survey data and an analysis of policies would be able to answer additional questions. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
The controversy over defining and classifying the AKP partly results from the fact that 
different researchers use different methodologies, looking at different aspects of the party, 
and it may well be the case that there are inconsistencies between these different aspects. This 
article, looking at the manifestos of the party in successive elections and comparing them 
with manifestos of other parties, is not in a position to resolve this controversy. The 
conclusions made are solely based on an analysis of discourse, without consideration of the 
party’s actual policies, voter base, or organizational structure. It does, however, provide a 
systematic analysis of one crucial part of the discourse of the party, the election manifestos, 
which has a number of advantages compared to other methods for studying the discourse of 
the party. 
Many studies examining the discourse of the party make use of leaders’ speeches on 
various occasions or the party program. These two strategies suffer from different defects. 
Analyzing party leaders’ speeches usually takes the form of convenient quotations to support 
the author’s views concerning the position of the party, with a necessary arbitrariness that 
accompanies this practice. Party leaders make a lot of speeches, talk about many issues, take 
                                                          
36
 Kenan Çayır, “The Emergence of Turkey's Contemporary ‘Muslim Democrats’”, in Secular and Islamic 
Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party, edited by Ümit Cizre (New York: 
Routledge, 2008). 
37
 İhsan Yılmaz, “Influence of Pluralism and Electoral Participation on the Transformation of Turkish 
Islamism”, Journal of Economic and Social Research 10, no. 2 (2008): 56. 
38
 Öniş, “Turkish Modernization”, 14. 
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different positions in line with current events and developments, and it does not take much 
effort to find sound bites declaring any number of positions. Unless one makes an effort to 
examine all or a systematic selection of a party leader’s speeches, quotes from such speeches 
will serve only demonstrative purposes. 
The other strategy, examining the party program, solves this problem by focusing on a 
document that is the official, and arguably the single most important, text laying out the 
position of the party, but it suffers from another deficiency: party programs are usually 
written at the formation of the party and are rarely subject to revision, whereas the position of 
a party concerning various issues changes over time, or new positions are created as new 
issues not foreseen in the program arise. 
Studying party election manifestos provides a fine compromise between these two 
strategies: they are official texts with a respectable claim to lay out the position and promises 
of the party (solving the problem of arbitrariness associated with unsystematic analysis of 
party leaders’ speeches), and they are subject to periodic revision, being written anew each 
election cycle (unlike party programs). For this reason, the study of election manifestos is 
invaluable for assessing a party’s positions on issues it considers important enough to be 
covered in the manifesto, and subsequent changes in these positions. 
The Manifesto Project is an ambitious effort for detailed coding of the election 
manifestos of major political parties in more than 50 countries. It places each and every 
quasi-sentence in election manifestos in one of 56 content categories,
39
 ranging from 
international relations to economy to issues of freedom and democracy. Thus, it becomes 
possible to compare parties not only over selected policy issues such as international relations 
or economic policies, but over the totality of the promises they make on the eve of elections. 
For the purposes of this paper, the dataset also allows a systematic comparison of the AKP 
not only with Islamist and center-right parties but with all Turkish parties that competed in 
elections since 1950s and won seats in the parliament.
40
 
The dataset shows the amount of space particular policy issues took up in each 
manifesto. For example, economic issues made up 32,5% of all the quasi-sentences in the 
AKP’s manifesto in the 2011 elections,41 whereas quasi-sentences on international relations 
made up 7,6% of the manifesto.
42
 In comparison, the CHP devoted 23,4% and 8,3% of its 
                                                          
39
 See Appendix for these categories. For more information on the Manifesto Project and the coding scheme, see 
the project website at https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/. 
40
 The project asks researchers in individual countries to code manifestos of “relevant parties”, which are 
defined as “those parties that win seats in their respective election” (see Annika Werner, Onawa Lacewell, and 
Andrea Volkens. Manifesto Coding Instructions. 4th Edition.) The dataset, available from the project website, 
contains data on the manifestos of all relevant parties that competed and won seats in the multi-party elections 
since 1950 in Turkey, a total of 54 manifestos. The dataset, however, contains only one manifesto for the 
Democratic Party in the 1950, 1954 and 1957 elections, and similarly only one manifesto for the Nationalist 
Action Party for the 1961, 1965, 1969, 1973 and 1977 elections. In other words, two manifestos of the DP from 
1950s, one manifesto of the MP from 1960s, and four manifestos of the MHP from 1960s and 1970s are 
missing. Although their inclusion would definitely influence the calculations made, this is a small number in a 
dataset containing 54 manifestos, and the substantial validity of the conclusions reached remains intact, with the 
caveat that they apply to a slightly smaller number of manifestos. 
41
 This is the sum of the individual percentages of the 16 economy related categories (codes 401 to 416, see note 
13 for more information), making up the domain of economy. 
42
 This is the sum of the individual percentages of the 10 categories on international relations (codes 101 to 110, 
see note 13) making up the domain of external relations. 
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manifesto to these issues, respectively, in 2011. This issue-emphasis perspective allows us to 
assess not only the specific positions that the parties took regarding issues, but also the 
relative emphases they placed on each issue category. For example, both the AKP and the 
CHP had positive things to say about European integration (code 108 - European Integration: 
Positive) prior to the 2011 elections, but the relative emphases they placed on this issue 
differed: EU-positive quasi-sentences made up 0,4% of the AKP manifesto, compared to 
1,3% of the CHP manifesto, which is a richer form of information regarding parties’ 
discourses, supplementing our knowledge on the positions of the parties vis-à-vis individual 
issues with information on the relative emphasis each issue received. 
 
Center-Right or Islamist? The Perennial Debate 
 
Many scholars cannot resist the temptation to join the debate on whether the AKP is an 
Islamist or a center-right party, and this debate is a heated one. Kardaş, for example, has 
argued that some authors explain the AKP with reference to Islamism because this is their 
area of specialization (quipping “to someone with a hammer, everything looks like a nail”).43 
On the other hand, Birkiye describes the party as a “light fundamentalist” party, with its “first 
attack […] directed at the institutions of Republican ideology”.44  
The debate will doubtless continue, but the Manifesto Project dataset on Turkish 
parties’ election manifestos allows us to see where AKP stands, manifesto-wise, compared 
with the center-right parties and Islamist parties in Turkey. To see whether the AKP 
manifestos are closer to the manifestos of center-right parties – namely the DP (Democratic 
Party), the AP (Justice Party), the ANAP (Motherland Party) and the DYP (True Path Party) 
– or to the Islamist parties of the MSP (National Salvation Party) and the RP (Welfare Party), 
we can use inverse factor analysis. Inverse factor analysis is a method that allows grouping 
observations (in our case individual manifestos) on the basis of their similarities or 
dissimilarities with one another over a number of variables (in our case the 56 content 
categories).
45
 In other words, manifestos which are closer to one another in terms of the 
relative emphases they place on policy issues will be grouped together. This act of 
classification will not be made on the basis of a single policy issue, such as religion or 
relations with the EU, but on the basis of all policy issues covered in these manifestos. 
Table 1 reports the results of an inverse factor analysis conducted with a pool of 
manifestos including the AKP, center-right parties (DP, AP, ANAP, and DYP) and Islamist 
parties (MSP, RP, and FP).
46
 The picture that emerges from this table is that the AKP, in all 
elections so far, was clearly grouped together with center-right parties and separately from 
Islamist parties. The first group, which brings together four AP manifestos from the 1960s 
and 1970s, four ANAP manifestos from the 1980s and 1990s, all three AKP manifestos from 
the 2000s, and the FP manifesto from 1999, clearly represents the center-right tradition in 
                                                          
43
 Kardaş, “Turkey under the Justice”, 178. 
44
 Birkiye, “Changes in the Cultural Policies”, 272. 
45
 In regular factor analysis, on the other hand, the objective is to bring similar variables together. 
46
 Although the scree plot of eigenvalues indicated three factors, only two factors were extracted to see how 
AKP manifestos would be grouped. 
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Turkish politics. The second group, which is dominated by five Islamist manifestos (two 
MSP manifestos from the 1970s and three RP manifestos from the 1980s and 1990s), also 
includes the one DP manifesto from the 1950s, the AP’s 1977 manifesto, DYP manifestos 
from 1987 and 1991, and the ANAP’s 1995 manifesto. All AKP manifestos are in the first 
group, and all MSP and RP manifestos are in the second group. 
That the first group represents the center-right tradition and the second group the 
Islamist tradition is also clear from the issue areas emphasized by each. The top five policy 
issues that are prioritized by the first group are “Governmental and administrative 
efficiency”, “Technology and infrastructure”, “Economic goals”, “Agriculture and farmers”, 
and “Welfare state expansion”. The second group, on the other hand, prioritizes “Political 
authority”, “Economic goals”, “Traditional morality: positive”, “National way of life: 
positive”, and “Democracy”. The high placement of “Traditional morality: positive” and 
“National way of life: positive” categories in the second group, and their conspicuous 
absence from the first list justifies calling the latter the center-right and the former the 
Islamist grouping. 
Three other observations are also due regarding this classification. First, the FP 
manifesto from 1999 is clearly placed within the center-right category, which means that the 
move towards the center, at least manifesto-wise, started with the FP not the AKP. Second, 
the AP clearly started out as a center-right party, but gave increasingly more emphasis to 
nationalist/Islamist issues under Demirel, especially in the 1970s when it faced competition 
for the first time from Erbakan’s MSP, finally culminating in 1977 in a manifesto with a 
higher Islamist than center-right score. (Note the increase in AP’s Islamist score from a mere 
0,090 in 1961 to a whopping 0,898 in 1977.) This tendency continued with the DYP in 1987 
and 1991 elections, and it was only under Çiller in 1995 and 1999 elections that the DYP 
returned to a manifesto with a stronger center-right emphasis. A similar movement towards 
Islamist issues and then back to center-right is also observed in ANAP manifestos. After a 
steady increase in its Islamist score from 0,086 in 1983 elections to 0,623 in 1995 elections, 
in which the RP won the most seats, the ANAP returned in 1999 to a stronger center-right 
emphasis. Third, the one DP manifesto we have from the 1950s is clearly in the Islamist 
group, but without access to all DP manifestos from 1950s, this fact alone is not sufficient to 
speculate about the relative weight of Islamist and center-right issues in the DP’s overall 
discourse. 
The overall picture that emerges from this effort is that the AKP manifestos are closer 
to the manifestos of center-right parties than to those of Islamist parties, but parties 
traditionally labeled center-right also published, from time to time, manifestos that were more 
Islamist in their issue emphasis than center-right. 
  
New Middle Eastern Studies 5 (2015) 
9 
 
Table 1: AKP manifestos in comparison to manifestos of Islamist and center-right parties 
Manifesto 
Factor 1 
(Center-Right) 
Factor 2  
(Islamist) 
DP_1950 0,147 0,924 
AP_1961 0,774 0,090 
AP_1965 0,770 0,228 
AP_1969 0,819 0,366 
AP_1973 0,752 0,514 
AP_1977 0,081 0,898 
ANAP_1983 0,774 0,086 
ANAP_1987 0,894 0,338 
ANAP_1991 0,768 0,501 
ANAP_1995 0,515 0,623 
ANAP_1999 0,719 0,151 
DYP_1987 0,428 0,855 
DYP_1991 0,415 0,689 
DYP_1995 0,775 0,235 
DYP_1999 0,785 0,171 
MSP_1973 0,415 0,656 
MSP_1977 0,179 0,868 
RP_1987 0,039 0,934 
RP_1991 0,088 0,678 
RP_1995 0,220 0,728 
FP_1999 0,832 0,187 
AKP_2002 0,679 0,160 
AKP_2007 0,881 0,080 
AKP_2011 0,790 0,012 
 
 Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 0,4358 0,4358 
Factor 2 0,3311 0,7669 
Note: Bold type identifies factor loadings above 0,50, representing membership in the Islamist or 
center-right groups. 
 
A Wider Perspective: Where AKP Stands 
 
The previous section tried to answer the question whether the AKP is closer to center-right or 
Islamist parties. Where the AKP stands in terms of policy emphases (as opposed to in terms 
of distance from center-right and Islamist parties) is another matter that requires a different 
approach. In this section, I first conduct a regular factor analysis to identify the main 
discourses used by Turkish parties in their election manifestos,
47
 and then look at which of 
these discourses are more prominent in AKP’s manifestos. 
                                                          
47
 For an earlier study using manifesto data to identify the axes of conflict in Turkish politics, see Ali Çarkoğlu, 
“The Turkish Party System in Transition: Party Performance and Agenda Change”, Political Studies 46 (1998). 
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Factor analysis is used to group associated variables together, trying to identify the 
underlying “factor” or factors that cause these variables to move in tandem. Applied to the 
manifesto data, factor analysis should identify which policy issues tend to be bundled 
together in individual manifestos, with each factor constituting a separate discourse. Thus, a 
factor analysis was conducted with a pool containing the manifestos of all Turkish parties that 
competed and won seats in the multi-party elections since 1950.
48
 Figure 1 shows the scree 
plot of eigenvalues for this factor analysis, which suggests five factors to be extracted. Table 
2 reports the results of the factor analysis conducted. 
Looking at the content categories that are most important for each factor, and the 
manifestos that received the highest scores for that factor, the five factors extracted were 
named ‘new left’, ‘technocratic’, ‘old left’, ‘nationalist’, and ‘free market’. Together these 
factors account for 40% of the variation in manifestos’ discourses. 
The ‘new left’ discourse places a strong emphasis on issues such as anti-growth 
economy, social justice, Marxist analysis, anti-militarism, peace, decentralization and 
multiculturalism. These are the content categories with the highest factor loadings for this 
factor, in descending order. This discourse is employed most prominently in the BDP’s 2011 
manifesto, but also in the SHP 1987, CHP 2011, SHP 1991, and AKP 2011 manifestos. 
 
Figure 1: Screeplot for the factor analysis 
 
  
                                                          
48
 Two DP manifestos from the 1950s, one MP manifesto from 1960s, and four MHP manifestos from 1960s 
and 1970s are missing from the dataset. Also see note 14. 
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Table 2: Five prominent discourses in Turkish politics  
New Left Technocratic Old Left Nationalist Free Market 
Manifesto Score Manifesto Score Manifesto Score Manifesto Score Manifesto Score 
BDP 2011 6,4 AKP 2011 2,25 CHP 1965 2,4 RP 1991 3,06 MP 1965 4,71 
SHP 1987 1,32 MHP 2011 2,09 CHP 1973 2,23 MHP 1977 2,09 ANAP 1995 2,37 
CHP 2011 1,11 CHP 2007 1,75 CHP 1969 1,8 MSP 1977 2,08 ANAP 1999 1,33 
SHP 1991 0,73 CHP 2011 1,57 AP 1961 1,63 MHP 2011 1,98 AP 1965 1,02 
AKP 2011 0,62 AKP 2007 1,35 SHP 1987 1,56 CHP 2007 1,59 MHP 2011 0,97 
Variable Factor1 Variable Factor2 Variable Factor3 Variable Factor4 Variable Factor5 
Anti_Growth 0,9132 Prot_Pos 0,6336 Agriculture 0,7623 Nation_Pos 0,6378 Wel_St_Limt 0,7146 
Soc_Just 0,8807 Tech_Infr 0,632 Contr_Econ 0,6111 ForSpe_Neg 0,6259 Labor_Neg 0,6888 
Marxist 0,8783 Welf_St_Exp 0,5968 Econ_Plan 0,5769 Miltry_Pos 0,5917 Free_Entrp 0,5844 
Miltry_Neg 0,8607 Env_Prot 0,56 Trad_Neg 0,5499 Int_Neg 0,5855 Soc_Harmny 0,3512 
Peace 0,5527 Edu_Exp 0,5493 Nationlztn 0,4902 Anti_Imp 0,5307 Edu_Lim 0,3322 
Decentral 0,5066 Culture 0,5402 Const_Pos 0,4662 Trad_Pos 0,5073 Keynesian 0,3101 
MultiC_Pos 0,4893 Int_Pos 0,528 Labor_Pos 0,4606 Law_Order 0,5001 Miltry_Pos 0,3022 
Democracy 0,408 Incentives 0,4444 Mid_Class 0,4311 Euro_Neg 0,4506 Welf_St_Exp 0,2456 
Free_HR 0,3708 Law_Order 0,3991 Miltry_Pos 0,3633 Prot_Pos 0,3972 Econ_Orth 0,208 
Labor_Pos 0,3008 Market_Reg 0,3796 Nation_Neg 0,3621 Pol_Corptn 0,2916 Const_Pos 0,2046 
 
 
Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 0.0943 0.0943 
Factor2 0.0900 0.1843 
Factor3 0.0870 0.2712 
Factor4 0.0796 0.3509 
Factor5 0.0561 0.4070 
 
Note: Of the 56 content categories, only the first ten with the highest factor loadings are reported for 
each factor. Bold type represents the most important components of the discourse for naming 
purposes, identified by the author. Please refer to the Appendix for the full names of the Manifesto 
Project categories. 
 
The ‘technocratic’ discourse focuses on issues of broad consensus that are likely to 
arouse few if any controversies in the Turkish context, such as protectionist economic 
policies (reflected in promises like ‘increasing exports’), investment in technology and 
infrastructure, welfare state expansion, environmental protection, education expansion, and 
cultural activities. Other names for this discourse could be ‘non-ideological’, ‘valence’ or 
‘populist’. This discourse was a favorite of parties competing in the most recent elections, 
most prominently employed in the AKP’s 2011 manifesto, but also in the MHP 2011, CHP 
2007, CHP 2011, and AKP 2007 manifestos. 
The ‘old left’ discourse combines advocacy for labor groups and farmers with an anti-
religious attitude and support for a strong role for the state in the economy, including state 
control of the economy, central planning, and nationalization of industry. This discourse is 
employed most prominently in the CHP’s 1965 manifesto, but also in the CHP 1973, CHP 
1969, AP 1961, and SHP 1987 manifestos. 
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The ‘nationalist’ discourse combines advocacy of nationalist causes with support for a 
strong army, a unilateralist attitude in international relations (reflected in content categories 
such as Foreign Special Relationships: Negative, Internationalism: Negative, Anti-
Imperialism, and European Integration: Negative), and a focus on law and order in internal 
affairs. This discourse is employed most prominently in the RP’s 1991 manifesto, but also in 
the MHP 1977, MSP 1977, MHP 2011 and CHP 2007 manifestos. 
The ‘free market’ discourse is distinguished from others with its negative attitude 
towards labor groups, advocacy of a smaller welfare state, and emphasis on free enterprise. 
This discourse is employed most prominently by the MP’s manifesto from the 1960s, but also 
by the ANAP 1995, ANAP 1999, AP 1965, and MHP 2011 manifestos. 
After identifying the most prominent discourses in Turkish politics as such,
49
 we can 
now move on to the question of where the AKP stands. Figure 2 charts the scores that the 
AKP received for each of the five factors in the 2002, 2007 and 2011 elections. These scores 
will allow us to analyze the components that make up the AKP’s overall discourse. In 
addition, because we have election-level data, we will be able to follow any changes and 
continuities in the AKP’s discourse over three elections. The minus scores in this figure are 
best interpreted as the avoidance of a discourse, and positive scores as positive emphasis on 
the issue in question. 
Looking at Figure 2, it is clear that the most persistent and important element in the 
AKP’s overall discourse has been the technocratic discourse, which was present in all three 
elections with positive scores. Moreover, the emphasis the AKP placed on technocratic/non-
ideological issues increased with each election, from 0,1 in 2002 to 1,3 in 2007 and 2,3 in 
2011. Thus, we can conclude that an increasingly salient technocratic focus has been the most 
important component of the AKP’s overall discourse. However, the party’s discourse has not 
been confined to technocratic issues only. Another discourse that increasingly became more 
important in the AKP’s manifestos was that of nationalism. From minus scores in 2002 and 
2007, the discourse of nationalism increased to 0,5 in 2011, receiving positive emphasis. 
Together with nationalism, the AKP manifesto in 2011 simultaneously branched out to the 
new left discourse as well, thus entering territories held by all three of its rivals (the BDP and 
the CHP had strong new-left emphases in 2011, and the MHP had a strong nationalist 
emphasis). After avoiding these discourses in two subsequent elections, in 2002 and 2007, the 
AKP embraced them in 2011, although not at the same level with the technocratic discourse. 
This tricky balancing act seems to have paid off too, with the party receiving 49,8% of all 
votes cast in these elections. 
                                                          
49
 It should be noted that factors representing these five discourses explain only 40% of the variation in Turkish 
parties’ manifestos. In other words, there are many minor discourses that are not captured by this framework. 
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Figure 2: Scores received by AKP Manifestos in the last three elections 
 
This manifesto-based quantitative analysis also captures the change in the policies of 
the main opposition party, the CHP. The party underwent a leadership change in 2010, with 
Deniz Baykal leaving the post of chairmanship to Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. Many analysts 
predicted a change in the position of the party from a more nationalist/secularist to a more 
social democratic stance. This is exactly the picture that emerges when we look at the party’s 
scores in 2007 and 2011 in Figure 3. The discourse of nationalism reached its peak in the 
CHP’s 2007 manifesto, receiving equal emphasis with the technocratic discourse, whereas it 
fell to zero in 2011. Simultaneously, the new left discourse, avoided both in 2002 and 2007, 
jumped to 1,1, becoming the second most prominent component of the CHP’s overall 
discourse in the 2011 elections. We can thus safely argue that the change in the leadership of 
the party is reflected in the change of the issues emphasized in its manifesto, with 
Kılıçdaroğlu moving the party away from nationalism and to some degree from free market 
ideas, to a new left discourse emphasizing social justice, an anti-military stance, 
decentralization and multiculturalism. 
 
 
Figure 3: Scores received by CHP Manifestos in the last three elections 
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Party Competition in the 2000s 
 
Narrowing our focus on specific discourses instead of on parties, we can also make an 
analysis of party competition in successive elections.
50
 The five discourses identified in the 
previous section are useful for comparisons involving all manifestos, recent and older, but to 
make comparisons involving the more recent elections only, we need to focus on three 
discourses: nationalist, technocratic and new left. These are the three discourses that have 
been heavily emphasized in the elections of the 2000s, whereas the other two are clearly 
‘owned’ by manifestos used in earlier elections (see Table 2). There is also another 
justification for focusing on these three discourses: they are the ones that experienced the 
highest amount of election to election variation,
51
 which means that the parties, when they 
decided to make changes in their positions, shifted their relative emphases on these three 
discourses. 
Figure 4 shows that in 2002 all parties
52
 avoided the nationalist discourse. For the 
MHP, this was unexpected and probably due to being part of a coalition with the Democratic 
Left Party and the ANAP between 1999 and 2002, during which the party had to accept many 
EU-related reforms. Their recent record in the coalition as a (reluctant) pro-EU party might 
have made it politically difficult to return to a nationalist stance. Regardless of whether this 
was the reason, the avoidance of the nationalist discourse in the 2002 elections seems to have 
cost the party dearly: they failed to pass the 10 percent threshold, and the party remained out 
of the parliament between 2002 and 2007. Avoidance of the nationalist discourse was 
certainly not the only reason for this failure, but probably was high on the list. 
 
 
Figure 4: The parties’ positions on nationalism 
 
The 2007 elections saw a positive emphasis on the nationalist discourse by two parties, 
the MHP and the CHP, whereas the AKP kept avoiding this discourse. This time, the MHP’s 
                                                          
50
 For a spatial study of party competition in Turkey using survey data, see Çarkoğlu and Hinich, “A spatial 
analysis of Turkish party preferences in 2006”. 
51
 The average absolute variations for the discourses in 2000s were as follows: 0,7 (Nationalist), 0,6 
(Technocratic), 0,4 (New Left), 0,3 (Free Market) and 0,1 (Old Left).  
52
 Only the AKP, CHP and MHP are included in this and following analyses. Even though it is represented in 
the parliament since 2007, the BDP is not included for the simple reason that the manifesto database does not 
contain information on the BDP manifestos. The BDP did not have official election manifestos because the 
candidates of the party ran as independents in 2007 and 2011 to avoid the 10 percent electoral threshold, which 
does not apply to independent candidates. 
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move made sense, but the CHP’s move was more interesting. Under Deniz Baykal’s 
leadership, the CHP veered towards a strongly nationalist, anti-EU position between the years 
2002 and 2007, which was probably motivated by the AKP’s enthusiastic embrace of EU 
reforms to diminish the influence of the military on politics. This was striking nonetheless, 
given the fact that the CHP voters in 2002 were more pro-EU than any other major party’s 
voters.
53
  
In the 2011 elections, all of the parties re-positioned themselves, with the MHP putting 
more emphasis on its nationalist discourse, the AKP giving positive emphasis to the 
nationalist discourse for the first time in its history (though at lower levels than the MHP), 
and the CHP abandoning the nationalist discourse completely after the leadership change 
mentioned above. This time, the AKP’s move was the most interesting, and many observers 
tried to make sense of it, some arguing that it was a short-term and opportunistic pre-election 
shift intended to get more votes from the MHP’s voter base.54 MHP spokesmen even accused 
the AKP of “fake nationalism” and “unprincipled vote-hunting”.55 
The discourse that saw the second highest level of variation from election to election 
was the technocratic one. All the parties had positive scores for this discourse in all the 
elections considered, and the general direction of movement was towards heavier emphasis 
on the discourse (five out of six movements were upwards). The only downwards change was 
observed in the CHP’s 2011 manifesto, but it was a modest one. Overall, then, it would be 
safe to argue that all the parties identified the technocratic discourse, which brings together 
issues such as investment in education, technology and infrastructure, cultural activities, 
environmental protection, welfare state expansion and increasing exports – all of which are 
relatively uncontroversial in the Turkish context – as a lucrative discourse that is best not left 
to the rivals, and tried to outbid one another. 
 
 
Figure 5: The parties’ positions on the technocratic discourse 
 
A similar observation can be made regarding the new left discourse, as reported in 
Figure 6, with two important provisos: first, the upwards movement started later (in 2011 not 
                                                          
53
 On this point, see Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Protest and 
Stability in an Islamic Society (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2007). 
54
 Onur Yükçü, “AKP, sağ ve 'milliyetçilik tıkacı' [AKP, the right and the 'block of nationalism']”, Radikal, 
September 9, 2012. 
55
 MHP deputy chairman Melih Yalçın as quoted in a story in the daily Milliyet. ANKA, “MHP'den AK Parti'ye 
'Çakma Milliyetçi' Suçlaması [MHP Accuses AKP of 'Fake Nationalism']”, Milliyet, February 11, 2011. 
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in 2007) and second, despite the common shift, there were still significant differences 
between the parties in terms of the amount of emphasis put on the discourse. Thus, in 
accordance with our expectations,
56
 the CHP was the party with the heaviest new left 
emphasis in 2011, the AKP was next, and the MHP was the last, with a barely positive 
emphasis. 
 
 
Figure 6: The parties’ positions on the new left discourse 
 
Overall, we can make the following observations about party competition in successive 
elections: 
 In 2002, the three parties were not very different from one another in terms of their 
nationalist, technocratic and new left discourses, all of them avoiding the nationalist 
and the new left discourses and emphasizing the technocratic one.  
 In 2007, relative positions in new left and technocratic positions did not change much, 
although there was an upwards shift in the latter. There was a radical re-arrangement, 
however, regarding the nationalist discourse, with the CHP leapfrogging MHP to 
occupy the uppermost position, and the AKP being differentiated from the other two 
parties by its avoidance of the issue. 
 2011 saw another re-arrangement, this time the CHP abandoning the nationalist 
discourse and significantly increasing its new left discourse. These simultaneous 
moves differentiated the party from both the MHP and the AKP in both dimensions: 
the AKP and the MHP were left with positive emphases on nationalism, and they 
occupied lower positions on the new left discourse compared to the CHP. On the 
technocratic discourse, the parties’ positions were again not differentiable, though the 
overall upwards movement continued. 
 
                                                          
56
 Many studies examining the placement of the Turkish parties on the left-right spectrum find the CHP to be to 
the left of the AKP, and the AKP to be to the left of the MHP. For one example, see Figure 6.2 in Çarkoğlu and 
Kalaycıoğlu, Turkish Democracy Today.  
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Conclusion 
 
This paper used the Manifesto Project’s data to study party competition in recent Turkish 
elections, with a focus on governing the AKP’s position vis-à-vis current and historical party 
manifestos. Using inverse factor analysis on manifesto data coded into 56 content categories, 
the first section concluded that the AKP’s manifestos were closer to those of center-right 
parties in Turkey, than to those of Islamist parties. The second section of the article first 
extracted the most salient issue bundles in Turkish parties’ manifestos since 1950s, finding 
new left, technocratic, old left, nationalist, and free market discourses to be the most 
important. In the AKP’s manifestos, the technocratic discourse was found to be the most 
important relative to other issues, receiving increasingly heavier emphasis in successive 
elections. In 2011, the party simultaneously branched out to nationalist and new left 
discourses too, meeting rivals on their own grounds. The last section compared parties’ 
relative positions on the nationalist, technocratic, and new left discourses. In 2002, the 
parties’ positions were virtually undistinguishable from each other on all three dimensions, 
whereas in 2007 and 2011 significant differences were observed between parties. In 2007 the 
AKP chose to differentiate itself from the other two parties by avoiding the nationalist 
discourse, a strategy followed by the CHP in 2011. Another strategy the CHP followed in 
2011 was to place heavier emphasis on new left discourse compared to the other parties. 
According to many observers, one of the AKP’s strategies in 2011 was to compete with the 
MHP for the nationalist vote, an observation borne out by the manifesto data. Parties’ relative 
positions on the technocratic discourse remained the same in all three elections. Overall, the 
MHP emerges as the most stable of the three parties in terms of the relative emphases placed 
on different issues, whereas the AKP and the CHP prove to be more flexible.  
A natural complement to the findings of this manifesto-based article would be survey-
based studies of voting behavior. Whether the moves of the parties in the ideological space 
are reciprocated by corresponding moves among their electorates would be an interesting 
research question. More specific questions could include, for example, whether the CHP 
manifesto’s embrace of the nationalist discourse in 2007 reflected a similar shift in the CHP 
voters’ preferences, or a determined leadership acting independently of the party’s rank and 
file. Was the AKP’s simultaneous embrace of the new left and nationalist discourses in 2011 
meant to appeal to two separate constituencies, one more nationalist the other more left-wing, 
or did it reflect a genuine effort to synthesize these two discourses? Are the MHP’s voters 
happy with the party’s consistency in its issue emphases, or do they expect more flexibility to 
increase chances of electoral success? Combined use of manifesto-based analyses and 
individual level survey data, which are increasingly more available in the Turkish context, 
would make it possible to answer these, and other, questions. 
Manifesto-based analyses could also be combined with an analysis of policies to 
answer other important questions. For example, some of the policies followed by the AKP in 
its third term have been described by observers as Islamist. Sales of alcoholic drinks were 
more tightly regulated, elective courses on the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad’s life were 
added to high-school curricula, and Erdoğan started to make more open references to Islam in 
his public speeches, all of which revived an old debate regarding AKP’s ideological position 
in Turkish politics: Was it an Islamist party posing as a moderate, center-right party only to 
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get votes and to avoid closure, as some of its critics argued when the party was first 
established? Or was the break with the Islamist National Outlook movement of Erbakan a 
sincere one? At the level of policies, the debate will doubtless continue on whether these 
policies are really ‘Islamist’ ones, reflecting a long-hidden plan to gradually Islamize Turkish 
society, only recently put into action now that the circumstances are allowing for it. Or are 
these policies ‘normal’ ones, naturally expected of any conservative party and within the 
confines of democratic politics, especially given the strong mandate the party received in 
election after election. At the level of official party discourse, however, we are not yet in a 
position to answer this question. As of this writing, the parties have not yet published their 
election manifestos for the upcoming 2015 parliamentary elections, and it is certainly 
plausible, given the AKP’s flexibility in its discourse documented in this article, that the party 
will put more emphasis on religious issues this time, which would provide textual evidence 
for the ‘return to Islamist roots’ argument.  
The findings are also relevant to the long-running debate between sociological 
approaches
57
 and rational-choice approaches
58
 in the voting behavior literature. The former 
tends to emphasize long-term factors such as group membership when examining individual 
voters’ party preferences, and is successful in explaining overall stability in party systems and 
the make-up of political cleavages in a country, whereas it is not very helpful in explaining 
election to election changes. The latter, also known as the spatial approach, has the opposite 
strength: it predicts a dynamic electoral market in which voters have preferences on different 
issues, and choose the party that happens to offer positions that are closest to their individual 
preferences. Parties, on the other hand, adjust their positions from election to election, in 
search of ever more votes, trying to tap into new issues that happen to arise on the election’s 
eve and to successfully predict which positions are most likely to be favored by large 
numbers of voters. This paper provides indirect support for the latter hypothesis, charting the 
sometimes dramatic shifts that Turkish parties underwent in 2000s.   
                                                          
57
 Lipset and Rokkan’s work on cleavages was a major influence on the sociological approach to 
voting behavior. See Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and 
Voter Alignments: an Introduction”, in Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National 
Perspectives, edited by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967). 
58
 Downs was such an important influence on spatial approaches to party competition and voting 
behavior that these approaches are sometimes referrred to as Downsian. See Anthony Downs, “ An 
Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy”, The Journal of Political Economy 65, no. 2 
(1957). 
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Appendix 
 
Manifesto Project’s coding categories, classified under seven separate headings, are as 
follows:  
 
Domain 1- External Relations: 101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive, 102 Foreign 
Special Relationships: Negative, 103 Anti-Imperialism: Positive, 104 Military: Positive, 105 
Military: Negative, 106 Peace: Positive, 107 Internationalism: Positive, 108 European 
Integration: Positive, 109 Internationalism: Negative, 110 European Integration: Negative.  
Domain 2 - Freedom and Democracy: 201 Freedom and Human Rights: Positive, 202 
Democracy: Positive, 203 Constitutionalism: Positive, 204 Constitutionalism: Negative.  
Domain 3 - Political System: 301 Decentralisation: Positive, 302 Centralisation: Positive, 
303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency:, Positive, 304 Political Corruption: 
Negative, 305 Political Authority: Positive.  
Domain 4 - Economy: 401 Free Enterprise: Positive, 402 Incentives: Positive, 403 Market 
Regulation: Positive, 404 Economic Planning: Positive, 405 Corporatism: Positive, 406 
Protectionism: Positive, 407 Protectionism: Negative, 408 Economic Goals, 409 Keynesian 
Demand Management: Positive, 410 Economic Growth, 411 Technology and Infrastructure: 
Positive, 412 Controlled Economy: Positive, 413 Nationalisation: Positive, 414 Economic 
Orthodoxy: Positive, 415 Marxist Analysis: Positive, 416 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive. 
Domain 5 - Welfare and Quality of Life: 501 Environmental Protection: Positive, 502 
Culture: Positive, 503 Equality: Positive, 504 Welfare State Expansion, 505 Welfare State 
Limitation, 506 Education Expansion, 507 Education Limitation.  
Domain 6 - Fabric of Society: 601 National Way of Life: Positive, 602 National Way of 
Life: Negative, 603 Traditional Morality: Positive, 604 Traditional Morality: Negative, 605 
Law and Order: Positive, 606 Civic Mindedness: Positive, 607 Multiculturalism: Positive, 
608 Multiculturalism: Negative.  
Domain 7 - Social Groups: 701 Labour Groups: Positive, 702 Labour Groups: Negative, 
703 Agriculture: Positive, 704 Middle Class and Professional Groups: Positive, 705 Minority 
Groups: Positive, 706 Non-Economic Demographic Groups: Positive 
